

FOREIGN POLICY bulletin



AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Why Hungary Resists

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by Emil Lengyel

Hungary's unprecedented stand against the U.S.S.R., which has astounded the world, may be better understood if viewed in terms of its history.

The map reveals the Hungarians' uncommon plight. Hungary is a dot on the periphery of the Soviet bloc, which spans the top of Eurasia and extends all the way to the Pacific. Imbedded in this huge bloc are other Slavs—Poles and Czechs. To the south, too, Slavs crowd against Hungarians—Serbians and Bulgarians among others. To the west, the Hungarians brush against the Germanic world, which extends to the Atlantic. Yet the Hungarians are neither Slavic nor Germanic. They are a Finnish-Ugrian group, and their nearest kin are the Finns and the Ugrian tribes of Europe's far north. Thus the Hungarians are sandwiched in between Slavs and Germans, and thereby hangs their tragic tale.

In the mid-Danube region they are an alien group, regarded by their neighbors as intruders. It was more than 1,000 years ago that they descended from the northern Carpathians. Where had they come from? Scholars have followed the Magyars' track from the eastern Himalayas all the way to the western slopes

of the Ural Mountains. Today these scholars incline to the belief that the Hungarians began their peregrinations from the Ural Mountains in search of greener grass and better protection, which they found eventually in the well-watered mid-Danube plain, famed for its deep dark soil. Wreathed around the plains is the chain of the Carpathian Mountains, which temper climatic extremes and have served the Hungarians as some protection against neighboring peoples.

In this mountain chain there is a gap where the Danube leaves Vienna as it descends into the plains, and it is this opening which seems to have determined the Magyars' fate. Exposed to the influence of both East and West, the Magyars opted for the West and under their Apostolic King St. Stephen embraced the Roman Catholic faith 1,000 years ago, in preference to the Constantinople-centered Eastern Orthodox Church. They have remained faithful to their choice ever since. Their art, literature and outlook on life have become Western-oriented. Visitors to their enchanting capital, Budapest, had never any doubt that they were in the West.

In the midst of an alien and therefore hos-

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tile environment the Magyars had to struggle for survival every inch of the way. Before they confronted Slav and Hapsburg their great struggle was waged against the Ottoman Turks. It was the Hungarians who felt the full impact of this monolithic force, and it was they who manned the ramparts of the Christian world.

When the Turks were finally forced out of Hungary in 1699 it was a pauperized and depopulated country, a vacuum which the Hapsburg dynasty was to fill in, beginning with the rule of Leopold I (1657-1705), after having occupied "free" Western Hungary since 1526. That mighty family eventually came to rule the bulk of the Danube region. "Whoever is master of Vienna," Austria's famous Prince Metternich was to say, "is bound to become Europe's master."

That they failed to gain more of the Continent may have been due partly to the Hungarians, who in the 17th and 18th centuries turned against their Hapsburg oppressors under the leadership of such men as Count Imre Thököly and Prince Francis Rákóczy. Portions of Hungary embraced Protestantism in the latter part of the 16th century, and even in the face of the Hapsburgs' aggressive Counter-Reformation the Magyars managed to salvage a portion of it in the very back yard of the most Catholic monarchs. To this very day the city of Debrecen, in the heart of the Magyar plains, is called "the Calvinist Rome." About a fourth of the people of Hungary are Protestants today.

The Hapsburg steamroller mowed down freedom, and Hungary was on the point of being denationalized. Then, early in the 19th century Magyarland revived as the new creed of nationalism swept across the gap in the Western hills. Its Hungarian leader this time was the legendary Lajos Kossuth, well known in the United States. The very name of Kossuth meant fight for freedom. He was the leader of the 1848 revolution against the Hapsburgs. How could a peasant folk dare defy the greatest dynasty of the age? Yet they dared to do so, and what is more, they were to overwhelm their masters. It was then that Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria sent an urgent appeal for help to Tsar Nicholas I of Russia. A Russian army of 140,000 promptly marched into Hungary under the command of Field Marshal Ivan Feodorovich Paskevich, who defeated the Hungarian freedom fighters on the plains near the town of Világos on October 6, 1849 and reported to his sovereign in Russia: "Hungary lies prostrate at Your Majesty's feet." The Hungarians were never to forget this Russian act.

Anti-Slav Frontier Nation

Because the Hungarians are a frontier nation and consider themselves an outpost of the West, also because of their past experiences and location among Slavs, they have developed a distaste for Slavs and especially for Russians. The only exceptions are the Poles, with whom the Hungarians feel they have much in common as hereditary foes of the

Russians, regarded by the Hungarians as Asian barbarians.

Nobody could have misinterpreted more profoundly the contemporary Magyar temper than Hungary's "Little Stalin," Mátyás Rákosi, who boasted in a speech as far back as 1952 that "non-Communist parties in Hungary have been destroyed." He had assumed that the Communists' unceasing "cradle to grave" propaganda had achieved its aim, but nothing of the sort happened. The traditions of the country, its distaste for the Russians, the memory of its fights for freedom during its turbulent history, and the strongly anti-Communist influence of the Catholic Church, easily prevailed.

It should be recalled that in this century the Hungarians fought against the Russians in both world wars. Hungary, as well as Poland, was used by both Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler as *Aufmarschgebiet*, a "staging area," for operations against Russia. In the more distant past, too, it was from the West that the danger of sudden destruction descended upon the Russian plains. To the Russians, therefore, the mid-Danubian region is strategically as important as Mexico would be for the United States if beyond it lived a forceful nation with an irresistible dynamism and a deeply felt conviction of its superiority. The tragedy we are witnessing today in Hungary is shaped, on the one hand, by the Hungarians' traditional struggle for freedom from encroachments by neighboring peoples and, on the

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Foreign Service Rates Praise

There is always a certain amount of change, of rotation, in the United States Foreign Service. Considering that our Foreign Service has some 7,000 members, that is not unusual. In fact it is inevitable. But the current change-over is basically confined to the top layer of diplomats—to chiefs of missions or ambassadors. And this change is primarily political.

After every election, ambassadors automatically turn in their resignations. If there had been a change in party control of the White House last November, we could expect a wholesale change-over in ambassadorships. As it is, even with President Eisenhower elected to succeed himself, changes in our diplomatic representation are in progress. Some who have been abroad for four years are resigning or being recalled. If they are political appointees they may not be reassigned; if they are Foreign Service officers they take new posts or a desk here in the State Department.

We read in the headlines that Douglas MacArthur II, present counselor in the State Department, is replacing career officer John M. Allison in Tokyo; Mrs. Clare Booth Luce is being replaced in Rome by James D. Zellerbach; John Sherman Cooper, who quit New Delhi to enter the Senate from Kentucky, is being replaced by Ellsworth Bunker. James W. Riddleberger is back from Belgrade to take a top State Department post; Ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich is preparing to leave London; Robert C. Hendrickson is back from New Zealand; C. Douglas Dillon may be replaced in Paris; Charles E. Bohlen would like a

change from Moscow; James B. Conant has filled out a long term in West Germany.

There will be more changes—with plenty of rumors preceding every major shift. For example, there has been the customary preannouncement speculation about who would replace Mr. Aldrich in London—generally conceded to be the top United States diplomatic assignment. The London post is expected to be taken over by financier John Hay Whitney, a close friend of the President.

The White House announced on December 8 that Massachusetts Governor Christian A. Herter* (who refused to help Harold E. Stassen block Vice President Nixon as second on the GOP ticket) will replace Herbert Hoover, Jr., about February 1 as the number two man in the State Department. Some here believe that Herter may eventually step up into John Foster Dulles' position as Secretary of State. However, Mr. Dulles' quick recovery from an operation, his evident zest for the job, plus President Eisenhower's admiration for his Secretary of State, suggest that the number one cabinet post is not up for change soon.

Political vs. Career Men

These diplomatic changes at the top again raise the question of political appointees vs. career men. The question, however, has lost much of its vehemence because of two facts: first, the steady increase in the number of career officers obtaining these

*Governor Herter was chairman of the Foreign Policy Association of Boston, 1929-1937; Mr. Zellerbach has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association; Mr. Bunker has been a member of the FPA Editorial Advisory Committee.

diplomatic plums and, second, the generally devoted and able contributions of political appointees.

Current figures show that roughly two-thirds of the chiefs of mission posts are now filled by career men—which is as good if not better than any showing in current history. When it is considered that some posts are too expensive for most available career men to fill and that every administration has political debts which require payment in embassyships, the wonder is the United States has as successful and able a group of mission chiefs as it has.

But perhaps the most noticeable thing about the Foreign Service today is its return to general public favor and approval. There was a time not too many years back, during what is called the McCarthy era, when recruitments to the Foreign Service fell to near zero. College graduates and others lacked interest in, even showed antipathy toward, Foreign Service careers. But if this year's applications for Foreign Service posts are any indication, this branch of government is back in the good graces of the public again. More than 7,000 applicants have signed up to take the examinations for the 750 openings—or about a 10 to 1 ratio of applicants to jobs. Much of the credit for this change goes to Dr. Henry M. Wriston, former president of Brown University, and his report, *Toward a Stronger Foreign Service*, published in 1954. A career in the Foreign Service is again an honorable and sought-for post. And to this, in a period of world crisis, it is perhaps fitting and proper to say, "Amen."

NEAL STANFORD



What U.S. Stakes in Middle East?

The United States, unlike Britain, France and Russia, is a newcomer to the turbulent arena of Middle Eastern affairs. True, Americans have generously contributed over many years to educational and welfare undertakings in that area. But it is only since World War II that the United States government has found it necessary to take an active part in the political and economic changes that keep the Middle East at boiling point.

This is both an advantage and a disadvantage for American policy-makers. The advantage is that the United States has no record of pre-World War II intervention to bedevil its current actions; and if it can dissociate itself from the unhappy record of its Western allies, Britain and France—as it did in the Suez crisis—it can hope to win the support, at least temporarily, of Egypt and the Arab countries. The disadvantage is that the United States has little or no experience in the intricate interrelationships of the region's dynasties, feuds, clashing aspirations and crisscrossing maneuvers, with the result that well-intentioned American diplomats are sometimes regarded by friend and foe alike as "innocents abroad."

While we may gain at the expense of both our Western allies and of Russia, which now seeks to replace them, by our relative political non-commitment, we may lose to Russia by our uncertainty about the military and economic commitments we are willing to make in the Middle East. And the image of the United States, which at the moment looks brighter to the Arabs than that of Britain, France and Russia, is tar-

nished for them by this country's intervention in the region's affairs as sponsor and financial backer of the state of Israel, the number one target of all the Middle Eastern states, including Iraq, which is friendly to the West and forms the keystone of the Baghdad pact.

As a newcomer, the United States is also suspected by the old-timers among the great powers. Britain and France, already irritated by what they regard as the failure of the United States to back them at Suez, are alarmed over the possibility that American capital may move into the economic vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Western powers not only in the Middle East but also in French North Africa. Russia, which has assumed a rapidly increasing role only in the past two years, with the eclipse of Britain, challenges the presence of the United States in the Middle East. And meanwhile the Germans, driven out of the Middle East in World War I, which ended their imperial dreams of a Berlin-Baghdad railway, and out of North Africa in World War II by the Allied defeat of General Rommel, are returning as efficient salesmen—and there is now talk in Bonn about German financing of the ill-fated Aswan High Dam.

Harsh Alternatives

The United States thus finds itself in a delicate and perilous role, like that of a dancer performing on eggs. Any false step may cause an irreparable crack in a precarious situation.

Of the several alternatives faced by Washington, none is clear-cut or wholly acceptable. If the United States supports Israel, morally and

financially—out of private as well as governmental funds—it alienates Egypt and the Arab countries, and thereby facilitates Moscow's anti-Israeli, pro-Arab propaganda. If it backs the Arab nations, it creates disillusionment in Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, and arouses the suspicions of Britain and France, which feel that their very survival is threatened by Arab nationalism from Cairo to Algeria.

If the United States tries to play off some of the Middle Eastern nations against each other, as it did by sponsoring the Baghdad pact, which it declined to join, it incurs the hostility of Egypt, Syria and Jordan without gaining the unqualified support of Iraq, which refuses to work with Britain because of the Suez crisis and is just as vehement as Egypt in its insistence that Israel should be driven "into the sea." And if it shows sympathy for its Western allies in NATO, it encourages the impression in Moscow and in the Arab capitals that NATO is just a façade for a new Western coalition intent on dominating the Middle East. To add to the confusion, American deliveries of Western Hemisphere oil to Britain and France may be regarded by the oil-producing nations of the Middle East as a sort of international "scab" action. Yet delays in American oil deliveries or difficulties in financing dollar oil purchases will be denounced by our allies as a betrayal of the West.

Given the uncommonly complex situation we face in the Middle East's explosive compound of anticolonialism, anti-Westernism, incipient do-

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World Oil Problems

by J. H. Carmical

Mr. Carmical has covered both domestic and international oil problems for more than 26 years for *The New York Times*, and has watched developments in the Middle East for the past 30 years.

The future of the free world is tied to the bountiful oil fields of the Middle East. Easy access to that oil is the key to the defense of the West, into which the United States has already poured billions of dollars in economic and military aid.

Middle East oil is essential to the industrial future of Western Europe, cornerstone of free-world defense. A large and steady supply of this fuel is necessary for the political stability and the social progress of the European democracies.

Soviet leaders know this. Government authorities in the free world also know it but sometimes are swayed from logical procedure by political expediency.

The people of Europe generally realize the situation. But the American public has little conception of the importance of Middle East oil in the world setup, partly because of our large fuel resources and the high level of industrial activity here.

Middle East Oil Stake

At present the West has an uneasy hold on the oil resources of the Middle East. That control may be at stake in the political tensions gripping that strategic area. With the world divided into two armed camps, the side holding such control may hold the winning hand.

The Middle East today is far more important to civilization than at any other time in its long history, during which various empires fought for its possession. To its geographical position—where Europe, Asia and Africa join—has been added vast wealth from the discovery of oil.

The vastness of the oil deposits that underlie the area can hardly be realized. The known reserves in one part—the Burghan field in the tiny sheikdom of Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf—are said to exceed the 35 billion barrels in the approximately 10,000 pools so far discovered in the United States. And here an intensive search for petroleum deposits has been going on for nearly a century, whereas the Middle East is a relatively new oil-producing area.

At the close of 1955 the known crude oil reserves of the Middle East were estimated at 126.2 billion barrels, exclusive of natural gas liquids. At that time that total was roughly two and a half times the aggregate of 52.2 billion barrels of the rest of the free world. Some important discoveries have been made since, raising the total for the Middle East. The untapped resources of the Middle East get into much larger estimates. Some geologists put the underground total at 250 billion to 300 billion barrels, or enough to supply the entire world for 50 years at its present rate of consumption.

Discovery Recent

Middle East oil was first discovered in Iran (then called Persia) by the British a little less than 50 years ago. However, it was not until the 1920's that the oil attracted much attention. Some progress was made in development of the resources before World War II. But the spectacular increase in production and known reserves has taken place in the 11 years since the end of that conflict. In that period about \$2.4 billion has

been invested in oil development.

After decades of jockeying, during which oil concessions in the Middle East went from one group to another, the area's vast resources of petroleum today are held approximately 52 percent by United States companies, 35 percent by British concerns, and the remainder by French and Dutch interests.

What does this big concentration of oil mean to the free world, particularly energy-hungry Europe? It means an abundance of power for development.

The general belief is that most of the "easy" oil in the United States already has been discovered. New pools are being found almost daily, but their output is hardly sufficient to meet the rising demand. For several years this country has been a net importer of petroleum. Currently some 16 percent of our requirements comes from abroad. With large deposits of coal and other hydrocarbons, there is no danger of an energy shortage here, but the cost of making such deposits available might retard industrial development, pending possible use of atomic power.

As the leader of the free world, the United States is vitally interested in the progress of other democracies. In the struggle between East and West, economic, industrial and political conditions should be such as to allow each nation to carry its share of the burden. Monetary aid to Western Europe has been used mainly to bolster its industrial output and strengthen its economy so that it would be prepared to pull its

weight in any East-West conflict. But the Europeans need fuel for their work and transport—and this is where the oil comes in.

Europe's Oil Needs

Europe has a petroleum output sufficient for only 7 percent of its needs. The remainder must be imported, and mostly from the Middle East. Since the end of World War II Europe's oil needs have more than trebled. They are rising at the rate of 10 percent yearly. In a resurgent Europe the inadequate coal supply provides only a minor source of fuel.

The recent closing of the Suez Canal and stoppage of the flow of oil through the Iraqi pipelines dramatically and suddenly demonstrated the importance of Middle East petroleum to Europe. Within a few days rationing had to be invoked in various countries and industry had to curtail activity, while the public dolefully faced the prospect of inadequate heat during the winter.

What U.S. Can Supply

The oil requirements of Europe and North Africa are a little more than 3 million barrels daily. Except for 200,000 barrels daily from local wells, all the petroleum must be imported. Of the imported oil, some 2.05 million barrels a day had been coming from the Middle East, 700,000 a day from the Caribbean area and the United States, and about 90,000 a day from the Iron Curtain countries.

By rerouting oil tankers around Africa and stopping importation of some 350,000 barrels of Middle East oil daily by the East Coast of North America, it is still likely that Europe and North Africa will be able to get 900,000 barrels of oil daily from the Middle East. However, this would leave a deficit of 1.11 million barrels daily, or about a third of the

normal total. Indications are that the deficit could not be made up entirely from the Western Hemisphere, despite the full aid and cooperation of the United States government.

In the free world there are only three major oil-producing areas—the United States, the Middle East and Venezuela. Only the latter two have exportable surpluses.

In the United States there is some excess productive capacity, presently estimated at 2 million barrels daily. But not all of that would be available for export because of lack of transportation from wells to deep-water terminals and tankers. Only for a short period in an emergency could oil from the United States be expected by Europe, and during the Suez episode only 350,000 to 378,000 barrels a day are likely to be shipped.

From Venezuela Europe can count on less than 100,000 barrels a day additional oil. Of Venezuela's present record output of about 2.5 million barrels daily, about 40 percent goes to the United States and a similar amount to other countries of Latin America. The remainder of its exportable surplus previously had been going to Europe and North Africa.

Even if there should be enough oil in the Western Hemisphere to supply Europe's needs, there is the question of payment. The oil produced in this hemisphere is "dollar oil"—that is, oil that must be paid for in dollars. With a shortage of dollars already existing in Europe, the United States government will have to finance a large part of the petroleum being shipped from the Western Hemisphere during the present crisis.

With the exception of Saudi Arabia, where the oil concession is held entirely by a group of American companies, the oil produced in the Middle East is "sterling oil." The pound sterling is the basic currency

in the producing area. For such oil there is no European exchange problem involved unless the nationality of the exporting company should be American, and then only to a small extent.

The value of oil in the Middle East in any global conflict would be problematical because of its proximity to Russia. Its definite value would be mainly for defense purposes before actual fighting, such as training troops and fueling ships and planes to link the widely separated areas of the free world, and to keep factories and transportation operating in areas short of other fuel.

Refineries for processing Middle East oil have been built in other parts of the free world, mostly by United States companies. About three-fourths of the 3.5 million barrels a day normally exported is in the form of crude oil to be processed in such plants. Refineries scattered throughout the free world not only are in less danger from air attack but aid the economy of many countries by furnishing jobs locally.

Russia's Aims

With Russia intriguing in Egypt, Syria and probably other areas of the Middle East, Moscow's aim appears to be to create a situation that will bar the free world from access to the oil fields, and thus cripple its economic and military forces. If this cannot be brought about through infiltration or similar tactics, direct intervention may not be ruled out.

Russia itself does not need the Middle East oil. The Soviet area produces enough for current domestic needs and a surplus for the export market. Geologists believe that the U.S.S.R. has enormous untapped oil resources, probably larger than those of any area except the Middle East. If the Middle East were under Soviet control the world's most extensive

oil resources would be in Communist hands and the Kremlin would be able to dictate the terms on which they would be made available to the rest of the world.

Russia has long had an interest in the Middle East. Even the Tsars talked of a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf. For years the five northern provinces of Iran were virtually under Russia's domination. In fact, after World War II Russia established a puppet regime in those provinces and was ousted in 1946 only after a determined stand by Iran, backed by Britain and the United States.

Within a few years, however, the Russians were back, using infiltration methods. Aided by some extremists, Soviet underground agents caused the Iranian government to expel the British from the country in 1951. Then followed seizure by the Iranian government of the installations belonging to the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., now the British Petroleum Company, Ltd. Infiltration of Iran increased after the expulsion of the British, with the result that in 1953 the Shah was forced to leave the country, and it seemed likely that at any moment the Communists would take over. The expulsion of the Shah backfired, however. Premier Mohammed Mossadegh's government fell; the Shah was restored to power; and the move of the U.S.S.R. to dominate Iran ended in failure.

The next major Kremlin move was in Egypt, leading to the momentous events of this year. The wooing began with a trade treaty and the sale of Soviet bloc arms to the Egyptians. Russia has also been active in Syria. When the Suez Canal was blocked recently, three pump stations of the Iraqi pipelines in Syria were blasted. Thus virtually at one stroke the free world was denied

transport facilities for 1.55 million barrels of oil a day through the canal and 525,000 a day through the pipelines. Several months will be required to repair the pipeline damage and resume the flow of oil at capacity after the operators are permitted to return.

The full part that Russia played in the Suez crisis may never be known. It is clear, however, that it had an important role and that the results were to its liking. Even if damage does not exceed the blocking of the canal and sabotage of the Iraqi pipelines, Europe has suffered an economic setback that will require months for recovery. And Russia for the first time in its history has a toehold on the Suez Canal.

What Oil Means to Arabs

Important as the Middle East concentration of oil is to the West, it means relatively more to the inhabitants of the area. Petroleum is their only important resource. It means to them a new life — schools, highways, hospitals, water, greater agricultural output and a higher standard of living.

With profits split 50-50 between oil companies and the producing areas, revenues are flowing to Arab governments and sheikdoms at the rate of \$1 billion a year. In addition, the countries get indirect benefits through trade and wages of several hundred million dollars paid annually to employees by Western oil companies.

In the ground the oil is useless. It has no value until brought to the surface. Then it must be moved to a refinery or deep-water terminal, preliminary to sale of virtually all of it abroad. This involved and costly procedure has been achieved successfully only by free-world organizations with a long history in the petroleum business. Iran tried for two

years to sell any important amount of oil in world markets—and failed.

Although Russia might have the know-how to develop the resources that the oil companies have discovered, it would have no place to sell such large quantities of petroleum. The Russians might find a market for a few thousand barrels daily in China and other parts of the Far East where they have influence. Outside the Russian sphere of influence sales would be slow. Despite the rising demand for oil in recent years in the free world, Russia has made little progress in effecting sales even through barter arrangements.

The Suez crisis has brought to the attention of the free world the importance of the Middle East oil reserves. It may have served a useful purpose if it leads Western political leaders to realize that those reserves must be held for the free world.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power, The Oilfields of Southwestern Asia: A Regional and Global Study* (New York, Macmillan, 1951); S. H. Longriggs, *Oil in the Middle East* (New York & London, Oxford University Press, under auspices of Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954); Charles J. V. Murphy, "Oil East of Suez," *Fortune*, October 1956, and "The Great Tanker Dilemma," *Fortune*, November 1956; Benjamin Shwadran, *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers* (New York, Praeger, 1955).

BOOKS ON AFRICA

Edmund Stevens, former foreign correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*, now representing *Look* magazine in Russia, gives a lively, well-informed account of France's trouble spots in North Africa, past and present, in *North African Powder Keg* (New York, Coward-McCann, 1955, \$3.75). Stuart Cloete, well-known South African writer and lecturer, paints a broad picture of Africa as he has seen it on extensive travels in *The African Giant: The Story of a Journey* (Boston, Houghton, 1955, \$4.00), ending with a question: "A great deal, an unimaginable amount, has been done for the African. But how much of it does he want?" Sir Charles Dundas sums up 40 years of experience as a British colonial administrator in Africa — Kenya and Tanganyika, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia — in *African Crossroads* (New York, St. Martin's, 1955, \$4.00).

Lengyel

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other, by Russia's fear that Hungary may once again become a jumping-off-place for an attack on its territory.

Dr. Lengyel, of Hungarian origin, is professor of education at the School of Education, New York University. He is the author of several books on Eastern Europe, including *The Danube* (New York, Random House, 1939) and *Americans From Hungary* (New York, Lippincott, 1948). He is also the author of the *Headline Series* "Eastern Europe Today" and has written articles for the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN.

Spotlight

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mestic revolutions which teeter between military dictatorships and communism, and the ever-present danger of great-power conflicts over the rich stakes of strategy, political control, and oil—the most promising approach is the one President Eisenhower chose in the fateful hours of the Anglo-French-Israeli attacks on Egypt.

This is the approach of trying to ease the manifold tensions of the Middle East—of which the Arab-Israeli conflict is but one facet—through negotiations in the United Nations. The United States may well be tempted to take over on its own the dominant role played in the Middle East since World War I by Britain and France as successors to the disintegrated Ottoman Empire. But

if it did so, it would incur the hostility of all the nations of the Middle East formerly ruled by our Western European allies, and encourage them to seek increased Russian support as a counterpoise to the West. The United States might also be tempted to challenge Russia directly in the Middle East—and thereby incur the onus of transforming the area into a battlefield, with disastrous consequences for Israel, Egypt and the Arab nations.

Judging, however, by Vice President Nixon's important foreign policy statement of December 6, the United States will try to avoid both

temptations and will seek a "lasting" settlement to assure "permanent peace" in the Middle East. It would be the better part of wisdom, however, to remember in future negotiations that history has seldom known "lasting" settlements and that peace in any area of the world—particularly an area whose problems are as complicated as those of the Middle East—can hardly be permanent as long as human beings continue to have emotions.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The third in a series of eight articles on "Decisions . . . 1957," a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



FPA Bookshelf

The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941, by Donald F. Drummond. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1955. \$7.50.

An objective, clearly written survey of the difficult years when the United States was gradually moving from neutrality to intervention in Europe and Asia. The author, assistant professor of history at the University of Michigan, has drawn on unpublished papers in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Library and in the files of the Department of State.

Kuwait and Her Neighbours, by H. R. P. Dixon. New York, Macmillan, 1956. \$12.75.

An interesting volume of personal reminiscences, by an Englishman who has lived for many years among the Arabs and has an intimate knowledge of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with useful maps and other illustrations.

Something Is Missing, by Arthur Goodfriend. New York, Farrar, 1955. \$3.50.

It is people and not governments that determine whether there shall be peace and freedom in the world, the author believes. People must therefore learn to understand each other. This book, which consists mostly of pictures, tries to give Americans a better understanding of Asians from Japan to Pakistan.

Federalism Mature and Emergent, edited by Arthur W. Macmahon. Garden City, Doubleday, 1955. \$7.50.

A collection of valuable essays, part of Columbia University Bicentennial Conference Series, the bulk of which are devoted to the nature and role of federalism in the United States, with special attention to "Basic Controls in a Maturing System," with a section on "Supranational Union in Western Europe."

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